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THE CORPORATE FARMING DEBATE IN THE 
POST .. WORLD WAR II MIDWEST 
JON LAUCK 
Ben Hogan balanced a mix of milk cows, corn, 
soybeans, sheep, and turkeys, avoided borrow-
ing too much, invented his own machinery, 
and maintained an orderly farm, keeping his 
fences "horse high, bull strong and hog tight." 
Above all, he worked hard: "He worked and 
never slowed. He bulled his way through the 
house before sunrise each morning, growling 
to his sons to get out of bed and do the chores." 
He motivated the sons, who worked as hard as 
he did, by telling them "You're the laziest 
damned rednecks I ever laid eyes on. You're 
the weakest goddamned mollycoddles I ever 
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seen." He souped up his tractors so "he could 
plow or disc or cultivate more acres per day 
than anyone else in the county." By the time 
World War II started he bought out three other 
farms around Nowell, South Dakota, expand-
ing his operation from 160 acres to 480.1 
Like millions of other midwestern farmers 
during the postwar price plunge, however, 
Hogan's fortunes collapsed. When his credit 
dried up, he borrowed money from the Nowell-
Safebuy processing plant, which had purchased 
his mortgage from the bank. The loan stipu-
lated that the turkeys he raised with the bor-
rowed money could only make their way to 
the Nowell-Safebuy, where the company could 
choose the turkeys it wanted and refuse to buy 
the undesirables. Ben hated the arrangement: 
"There ain't a dirt farmer got a pot to piss in, 
what with prices are this year. ... A man 
either keeps raising turkeys or he don't get no 
loans. A man can't make it without loans. 
There's no telling how many farms gone under 
that way since the war. And the Nowell-
Safebuy ends up with 'em all." When feed costs 
increased, Nowell farmers could not make their 
loan payments and filed suit against Safebuy. 
The judge ruled that the contract gave Safe buy 
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"undue bargaining power to set prices on the 
products it buys and undue power to depress 
prices in a regional market it virtually con-
trols" and refused to "enforce unconscionable 
bargains." The company then decided on a 
new corporate strategy, actual ownership of 
the turkey farms, bypassing the family farmers 
completely and creating a larger, more effi-
cient, integrated corporate farming institu-
tion.2 
The strategy of the Nowell-Safebuy de-
scribed in Douglas Unger's novel Leaving the 
Land is not new. Corporate attempts to take 
advantage of scale in American farming are as 
old as the Republic, but their limited successes 
kept public criticism at a minimum. The years 
after World War II, however, marked a "major 
turning point in American agricultural his-
tory" when corporate farming-agricultural 
production conducted by large-scale industrial 
corporations in lieu of family farms-became 
a heated public issue.3 "[Y]ou would end up 
with what they had in Poland," predicted the 
manager of the Grain Terminal Association, 
"where a large number of great big, fat land-
lords owned the land, and it was worked by 
millions of peasant's-complete feudalism." 
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), a prominent 
leader in the effort to curb corporate farming, 
constantly attacked the "trend toward corpo-
rate farms" and attempts by corporate agri-
business to "complete the vertical chain from 
seed to supermarket."4 Such fears resulted in a 
series of studies and long public debates over 
the issue and prompted significant legislative 
action, especially at the state level. In retro-
spect, contemporary warnings about the" emo-
tional appeals" of the anticorporate farming 
advocates and the "crisis atmosphere" they 
created seem justified. 5 The changes that took 
place were more influenced by the consolida-
tion of existing family farms than any outside 
"corporate invasion." 
The debate continues, however. In 1982 
Nebraska passed Initiative 300, amending the 
state constitution to allow only family-farm 
corporations to engage in farming. In 1983 
Jim Hightower, the anticorporate farming ac-
tivist, was elected agricultural commissioner 
in Texas. In 1988 South Dakota toughened its 
corporate farming law to prevent National 
Farms from establishing a large-scale livestock 
operation in the state. More recently, four-
teen counties in Kansas put anticorporate farm-
ing laws on the ballot and they passed in 
twelve. More than a dozen family-farm, reli-
gious, and environmental groups are currently 
working to prevent large-scale hog operations 
from becoming the norm in Iowa.6 
In the postwar years the president of the 
National Farmers Organization (NFO) be-
lieved that the country was "losing free men" 
to a corporate agriculture that would soon 
control farmers' lives like the large growers in 
California controlled Mexican farm workers. 
He viewed corporate involvement in farming 
as "Phase I of a corporate takeover of the food 
industry, which would involve acquiring or 
controlling all phases of production, process-
ing and retailing."7 The Washington Post noted 
fears of "20th century agricultural feudalism," 
the president of the Agricultural History So-
ciety cited the fear of "a latter-day enclosure 
movement in the American countryside," and 
a prominent agricultural economist feared 
"farming [would] be swallowed up" by corpo-
rate conglomerates "as nonchalantly as a peli-
can swallows a fish."8 
The arguments drew on the historical view 
that the proper form of the market economy 
was that of many scattered small-scale pro-
ducers, a system perverted by the coming of 
big business in the late nineteenth century. 
The result was the concentrated wealth and 
power of the "moneyed men," the essence of 
the "monopoly problem" to some, in sectors 
like steel making and car building. The oppo-
nents of corporate farming feared that "agri-
culture [would] become-like steel, autos, and 
chemicals-an industry dominated by giant 
conglomerate corporations such as Tenneco." 
Protesting the establishment of a large-scale 
hog production facility in the early 1970s, the 
NFO declared that "Weare not going to allow 
a handful of corporate executives to control 
food production in the manner in which they 
now control oil, drugs, and autos."9 
Given the events of the era, frequent com-
parisons were made to the competitive prob-
lems of the oil industry. Congressman David 
Obey (D-WI) compared the corporate farm-
ing issue to "Our troubles with a few oil gi-
ants," and Micki Nellis of American Agricultural 
News argued that "When the same companies 
which control the energy also control the food, 
they can bring any nation to its knees-in-
cluding America." Senator Abourezk of South 
Dakota agreed that "While monopoly control 
in food is not yet what it is in oil, all the 
symptoms are there." An oft-sighted bumper 
sticker on midwestern pickups: "If you think 
oil prices are high, wait till they own the 
farms. "10 
Earl Butz, Nixon's choice to be secretary of 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
in 1971, contributed further to the fears of 
corporate farming. Butz worked for the much-
hated Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft 
Benson in the 1950s, advocated rolling back 
farm programs, encouraged larger farms, and 
served on the boards of agribusinesses like 
Ralston-Purina and Stokely-Van Campi he was 
barely confirmed by the Senate after a bitter 
debate. When anti-corporate farming bills 
came before the Congress his department op-
posed them, earning him condemnation as an 
"apologist for corporate power" from the New 
York Times and many othersY 
The views of those farmers who felt they 
were being sold out to corporate agriculture 
seemed legitimized when it was revealed that 
some government officials were involved as 
corporate officers or consultants to agri-
business. Clifford Hardin, who was replaced 
by Butz as secretary, took an executive posi-
tion with Ralston-Purina when he left. 
Clarence Palmby, who was assistant secretary 
of agriculture when the Russian grain sales of 
1972 were organized, afterward went to Con-
tinental Grain Company, one of the major 
companies involved in the transaction. An-
other assistant secretary, prior to taking his 
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post, was a senior vice president at Bank of 
America, which was involved in corporate 
farming investments. Virgil W odika,· before 
taking over the Food Bureau of the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), was a paid con-
sultant to Ralston-Purina, Libby, McNeill & 
Libby, and Hunt FoodsY 
Thus, Congressman Jim Abourezk (D-SD) 
could tell the statewide South Dakota Farm-
ers Union picnic in 1972 that USDA officials 
were "retreads from the Benson era or recent 
recruits from the corporate boardroom." When 
running for president that year, Senator 
George McGovern asserted that Butz "was 
thoroughly committed to the gentlemen farm-
ers in agribusiness, who couldn't tell a chicken 
coop from a chain store." Senator Fred Harris 
(D-OK) could argue that "the government has 
continually sided with the giant agribusinesses, 
turning its back on the little man." Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) warned the Iowa 
Farmers Union that "we may be forced to watch 
corporate agriculture spread its tentacles to 
every farm in the nation." When running for 
president in 1976, Jimmy Carter could de-
nounce the "sweetheart arrangement" between 
USDA, big grain firms, and agribusiness. The 
Agribusiness Accountability Project could la-
bel the agribusiness-USDA connection as 
"Agri-Government." And a farm couple could 
tell Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) that 
"the Department of Agriculture & Adminis-
tration & Big business guns [were] out to get 
[them]."13 
Many believed that corporate influence also 
dominated the land-grant colleges that were 
responsible for research and extension services 
fO.r agriculture. The farm activist Jim High-
tower argued in 1972 that "[The land-grant 
college complex]-composed of colleges of 
agriculture, agricultural experiment stations 
and state extension services-has put its tax 
dollars, its facilities, its manpower, its ener-
gies and its thoughts almost solely into efforts 
that have worked to the advantage and profit 
oflarge corporations involved in agriculture." 
Instead of providing leadership on issues like 
the corporate farming debate, "the land grant 
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community has ducked behind the corporate 
skirt, mumbling apologetic words like 'prog-
ress,' 'efficiency,' and 'inevitability.'" When 
land grant colleges did conduct research, many 
farmers and farm groups did not believe the 
studies because of the colleges' corporate con-
nections. 14 
The federal Small Business Administration 
(SBA) also received criticism. Created in the 
1950s to offer low-interest loans to start-up 
businesses, the SBA made loans to individuals 
hoping to start livestock confinement opera-
tions, creating a great deal of hostility from 
farmers already established in livestock pro-
duction. Senator Nelson, chairman of the Sen-
ate Small Business Committee, noted SBA 
support for hog confinements: "The SBA's loan 
practice in this area is especially disturbing 
because hogs are known to many farmers as 
'mortgage burners'-low capital ways for young 
farmers to get a foothold in farming. As it 
stands, the SBA's policies are helping to fund 
the very factories which are driving people 
out of farming."15 
The suspicions and fears and prognostica-
tions of a "corporate takeover" of production 
agriculture were consistently legitimized by 
farm-state politicians. The corporate farming 
issue became a staple of postwar Democratic 
politics beginning in the 1950s. George 
McGovern of South Dakota is a good example. 
When changes in the poultry industry in the 
1950s increased production and efficiency, it 
tended to drive egg prices down, triggering 
angry letters from farmwives about the dwin-
dling amount of "egg money." McGovern re-
sponded by criticizing the "huge corporate 
interests" and "vertical integration" in farm-
ing. 16 During his 1960 senate race against Sena-
tor Karl Mundt (R-SD), McGovern told a 
Democratic fund-raiser that "If Nixon is 
elected, with men like Mundt who support 
him ... the family farm is doomed as an insti-
tution and corporate agriculture will sweep 
the country."17 When he ran for president in 
1972 he advocated his bill to "prohibit giant 
non-farm conglomerates from taking over fam-
ily farms" and the Democratic platform stated 
that the "family-type farm is threatened with 
extinction. American farming is passing to 
corporate control."18 Politicians such as Sena-
tors Nelson, Hubert Humphrey (MN), Walter 
Mondale (MN), James Abourezk (SD), Harold 
Hughes (IA), Frank Church (ID), and Fred 
Harris (OK) all invoked the issue in similar 
ways. 
In addition to elected officials and the warn-
ings of prominent farm organizations like the 
Farmer's Union and the NFO, religious lead-
ers (especially Catholics), environmentalists, 
assorted writers, and network television were 
involved in the corporate farming debate. The 
rural life director of the Catholic Church in 
South Dakota told the state legislature that 
"The family and ownership ofland is the natu-
ral God-given way of human living and when-
ever the church or the state or powerful 
influential people forget that, and take over 
the ownership of God's land in a dispropor-
tionate manner, the economic, spiritual, and 
social balance of a nation is disturbed and evils 
of every kind result." The director of the Heart-
land Project of midwestern Catholic bishops 
asked that the "ideology of 'free enterprise'" 
be subsumed to "Christian, Jewish, and hu-
manist perspectives that emphasize relation-
ship, interdependence, and distributive justice, 
including fair compensation." In 1973 the N e-
braska Catholic Conference advocated legis-
lation to stop the "expansion of giant farm 
corporations" and called on Catholics in Ne-
braska to inform themselves on the issue, to 
celebrate Rural Life Sunday, and to support 
groups with similar views; internationally, the 
church adopted the view that "if certain landed 
estates impede the general prosperity because 
they are extensive, unused, or poorly used, or 
because they bring hardship to peoples or are 
detrimental to the interests of the country, 
the common good sometimes demands their 
expropriation."19 In 1979 the president of the 
National Catholic Rural Life Conference re-
minded Catholics that "we are but sojourners 
and guests upon the Lord's land," promoted 
farming "as a way of life," and criticized "An 
agriculture characterized by industrialized 
farms with absentee owners [which] benefits a 
relatively privileged few and seriously weak-
ens the nation's stability." The forty-four mem-
bers of the Midwestern Roman Catholic 
Bishops also published the pamphlet Strangers 
and Guests: Toward Community in the Heart-
land, which proposed ending corporate acqui-
sitions of farmland. 20 When the NFO, which 
had a disproportionately high number of 
Catholic members, started advocating collec-
tive bargaining for farmers as a strategy for 
preserving family farms and avoiding corpo-
rate agriculture, the church supported their 
efforts. Pope John XXIII even released a papal 
encyclical on agriculture promoting collective 
bargaining.21 
Environmentalists also objected to corpo-
rate farms, viewing them as "unnecessarily dis-
ruptive of the environment," using more 
pesticides and herbicides, generating more 
waste, and producing surpluses that depressed 
prices, hurting small farmers. 22 Senator Nelson, 
one of the earliest advocates of environmen-
tal protections in the 1960s and 1970s, urged 
cooperation between environmental groups 
and small farmers. During debate over an 
anticorporate farming bill in 1972, Nelson's 
legislative assistant told environmentalists to 
support the bill because the "small, indepen-
dent farmer has close ties to the land and 
therefore is far superior to the insensitive man-
ager when it comes to environmental protec-
tion."23 
Activists included Wendell Berry, probably 
the best-known critic of "industrial agricul-
ture." When Earl Butz reviewed Berry's book 
The Unsettling of America, the clash between 
Butz's view of free-market economic change 
and Berry's defense of "agricultural funda-
mentalism" and the "man-earth relationship" 
became clear.24 The Center for Rural Affairs, 
founded in 1973 in Walthill, Nebraska, by the 
activist Marty Strange, consistently advocated 
reducing technology and energy-intensive in-
puts, the use of which it considered part of the 
country's "cultural crisis," and promoted "re-
newable and sustainable" farming as an alter-
native.2s 
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In 1971 NBC produced a program entitled 
"Leaving Home Blues: An NBC White Paper 
on Rural Migration." In the program, news 
correspondent Garrick Utley spoke of "forced 
migration: the movement of people from rural 
America who don't want to go. Who would 
not go if they had a choice. But the choice is 
gone: devoured by markets and mechaniza-
tion in agriculture and the failure of industry 
or government to provide new or adequate 
jobs." Nebraska, one of the areas featured in 
the program, in the ten years prior to 1971 
had seen 73,000 more people leave the state 
than enter. One Nebraska farmer offered to 
show the newsmen all the vacated farmsteads 
and the planted fields where farmers' homes 
had stood five or ten years prior. The program 
forcefully depicted the problem of rural de-
population but infuriated anticorporate farm-
ing advocates for not making a more specific 
link to corporations. The Agribusiness Ac-
countability Project, which helped NBC pro-
duce the show, attacked the network's 
president for his "toothless," "superficial," and 
"cowardly" production, accusing him of delet-
ing the mention of "every corporate offender 
that is big enough to cause trouble for NBC."26 
The Agribusiness Accountability Project and 
others made clear to the public that they be-
lieved corporate farming accounted for the 
outmigration. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of 
an impending corporate order in grain belt 
farming were precedents in the American 
South, California, and the Third World. The 
changes in poultry that led to a large degree 
of contractual integration between corpora-
tio,ns and small farmers was perhaps the most 
daunting. As the New York Times told the 
story, "Until after World War II, many broil-
ers were raised in the barnyards of family farms. 
Small flocks of chickens, always underfoot, 
supplied added income, cash for birthday pre-
sents or a winter weekend in the city. Today, 
there is virtually no market for barnyard chick-
ens. Instead, the family farmer is usually grow-
ing broilers under contract for one of the 
big-agrigiants." The corporation could reduce 
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payments or cut the farmer off completely at 
any time, but it was difficult for the farmer to 
escape since he owed the corporation for the 
production supplies furnished by the corpora-
tion. The situation triggered lawsuits on the 
Delmarva Peninsula and farmer-picketing of 
corporate offices in northern Alabama.27 The 
USDA calculated that the chicken farmers 
were making about 54 cents an hour, an ar-
rangement denounced as "poultry peonage" 
by Ralph Nader and his raiders. Roger 
Blobaum, an Iowa Democrat who ran for Con-
gress in 1970, argued that "The value of cor-
porate secrecy was dramatically illustrated in 
the 1950s when feed companies persuaded 
chicken growers in the South to sign contracts 
that made them as powerless as sharecroppers." 
Harrison Wellford, a Harvard fellow connected 
to Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive 
Law, invoked the fear of such conditions mi-
grating north: "The role of major national cor-
porations such as Ralston-Purina and Pillsbury 
in the integrated chicken industry of the south 
should be instructive for all those who wish, 
for social or economic reasons, to preserve the 
independence of the family farmer."28 The 
president of the NFO in 1971 issued warnings 
about the "Kleen Leen" integration contracts 
offered by Ralston-Purina, who "draws on years 
of experience turning independent broiler 
growers in the South into low-income con-
tractors."29 The president of the NFU argued 
that "This is bringing business integration right 
onto the farm, somewhat reminiscent of the 
notorious sweat shop system for sending piece-
work into tenements for cheap hand labor." 
Jim Hightower asserted that "This corporate 
invasion of poultry has humbled thousands of 
these small farmers, reducing them from hearty 
free-enterprisers to assembly-line cogS."30 
Many feared that the "contract system [that] 
has turned many chicken producers into little 
more than low-paid employees of the large 
broiler companies" would also develop in 
grain-belt hog, cattle, corn, wheat, and bean 
sectors. The NFO consistently cautioned 
against the coming of vertical contracting to 
the grain belt. As they saw it, packers and 
processors could use individual contracts with 
farmers to undermine the collective bargain-
ing for a master contract that the NFO advo-
cated. Ralph Nader came to the NFO 
convention in 1971 and echoed the complaints 
about the government's "refusal to invoke the 
antitrust laws against vertical integration."31 
Grain belt fears of corporate takeover were 
also enhanced by stories originating in Cali-
fornia. Tenneco, Standard Oil of California, 
and Belridge Oil Company, for example, all 
bought large pieces of land on which to grow 
fruits and vegetables. The Federal Trade Com-
mission actually charged United Brands and 
Pure x Corporation with seeking to monopo-
lize the production of fresh vegetables, argu-
ing that United Brands was trying to change 
the lettuce and celery business from one of 
small, independent growers to one dominated 
by conglomerates. The concerns among grain-
belt farmers were also heightened by the steady 
stream of stories in the postwar period about 
the plight of farm workers, especially in Cali-
fornia. Many believed that theirs was a future 
of wage-labor to mega-farms, like the Mexi-
cans picking lettuce, grapes, strawberries, and 
tomatoes in the Central Valley-like the J oads' 
journey from independent Plains farmers to 
California farm workers in The Grapes of 
Wrath. Religious leaders and social reformers 
in the 1950s, reform politicians and the media 
in the 1960s, coupled with President Johnson's 
War on Poverty, highlighted the problems of 
the farm workers of California. When the 
Agribusiness Accountability Project was 
formed in December 1971, its stated purpose 
was to study the problems of farm workers and 
expose the agribusiness conglomerates that 
frustrated efforts to help them-it was not long 
before the mission of the organization was 
expanded into corporate farming and antitrust 
areas. 32 
Lurking behind the fears of the California 
system was a 1946 study-The Tale of Two 
Cities-of two small California towns in the 
Central Valley, Arvin and Dinuba. One of 
the communities was dominated by large-
scale corporate farming and the other was 
structured in a pattern similar to small towns 
in the grain belt, with many small, dispersed 
family farms cotnp£ising the agricultural com-
munity. Although the two towns were in the 
same climate, produced the same amount of 
commodities, and were equidistant from other 
towns, cities, and transportation, other differ-
ences were striking. The town surrounded by 
family farms had more and better schools, 
churches, recreational facilities, civic organi-
zations, public services, a better standard of 
living, greater individual ownership, and a 61-
percent-larger retail trade. Many grain belt 
leaders believed such traditions and institu-
tions in their small towns would be destroyed 
with the coming of corporate farming. 33 
When the United States became heavily 
involved in foreign aid after Wodd War II, 
policy-makers placed a steady emphasis on land 
reform in recipient countries. Said President 
Truman to the United Nations: "We know 
that peoples of Asia have problems of social 
injustice to solve. They want their farmers to 
own their land and to enjoy the fruits of their 
toil. That is one of our great national prin-
ciples also. We believe in the family size farm 
that is the basis for our agriculture and has 
strongly defended our form of government." 
Ngo Dinh Diem received lectures about the 
need to broaden land ownership in South Viet-
nam and the countries of Latin American were 
steered in this direction by the Alliance for 
Progress, as were all the countries that partici-
pated in the United Nations' World Land 
Reform Conference in 1966. Harold F. 
Breimyer, an agricultural economist at the 
University of Missouri, noted that "Our de-
velopment counselors exhort nations so bur-
dened to undertake agrarian reform. Fine; but 
we ought also be mindful of our own state of 
affairs" and other farm advocates offered warn-
ings about the potential "Central American-
ization" of the grain belt.34 Later in the same 
year that Breimyer made his comments, for 
the first time in American history, a National 
Land Reform Conference was held in San Fran-
cisco and the corporate farming issue discussed. 
Smaller midwestern land conferences were 
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later held to carryon the work started in San 
Francisco, and Senator Fred Harris (D-OK) 
extolled the "need for land reform" in the Sen-
ate.35 The president of the NFU even advo-
cated a land reform program in which the 
federal government would buy good land for 
resale to small family farmers at reduced prices. 
In 1975 the NFO called attention to the death 
of Wolf Ladejinsky, who fled Bolshevism in 
the Soviet Union in 1922, came to the United 
States and received a master's degree in agri-
cultural economics in 1931 from Columbia, 
and became an advocate of land reform. By 
helping to coordinate the redistribution of land 
in postwar Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
South Vietnam, he became "Russia's greatest 
enemy in Asia." The NFO noted that when 
the communists invaded South Korea, they 
met little resistance where land was held by a 
few large landholders but met heavy resistance 
where land reform had succeeded: "The in-
habitants there had a stake in the land and 
organized to defend it." They juxtaposed 
Ladejinsky's work with Secretary Butz's "ad-
vocacy of big, integrated agricultural opera-
tions."36 
As the Arvin and Dinuba and land reform 
arguments indicate, one of the core criticisms 
of corporate farming involved the corrosive 
affect of concentrated land ownership on re-
publicanism and the civic tradition. The im-
ages of antirepublican regimes like the landed 
caudillos of Latin America, the injustice of 
concentrated land ownership in South Viet-
nam, the feudal kingdoms of medieval Eu-
rope, and the enclosure movement were all 
invoked against corporate farming. As oppo-
ne.nts saw it, the new land barons would be 
corporate conglomerates like Tenneco and 
ITT. The goal of the Arvin and Dinuba study 
was to test the "hypothesis that the institu-
tion of small independent farmers is indeed 
the agent which creates the homogenous com-
ml.mity, both socially and economically demo-
cratic." The president of the Iowa Farmers 
Union was opposed to "corporate agriculture 
of the Fascist type," and Senator McGovern, 
on the floor ofthe Senate, wondered "whether 
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the new society toward which we are heading, 
a sort of corporate collectivism, is what we 
really want."37 Not by accident, Senator 
Nelson's subcommittee print after the corpo-
rate farming hearings quoted Webster: 
Our New England ancestors brought thither 
no great capitals from Europe; and if they 
had, there was nothing productive in which 
they could have been invested. They left 
behind them the whole feudal policy of the 
other continent .... They came to a new 
country. There were as yet no lands yield-
ing rent, and no tenants rendering service. 
The whole soil was unreclaimed from bar-
barism. They were themselves either from 
their original condition or from the neces-
sity of their common interest, nearly on a 
level in respect to property. Their situation 
demanded a parcelling out and division of 
the land, and it may fairly be said that this 
necessary act fixed the future frame and 
form of their government. The character of 
their political institutions was determined 
by the fundamental laws respecting prop-
erty. . . . The consequences of all these 
causes have been a great subdivision of the 
soil and a great equality of condition; the 
true basis, most certainly of popular gov-
ernment.38 
Fewer farms also meant more farmers were 
forced to migrate to the most unstable, vio-
lent (especially in the mid-1960s), socially 
stratified, and undemocratic of places, the big 
cities. "The mobs of great cities," Thomas 
Jefferson said, "add just so much to the sup-
port of pure government, as sores do to the 
strength of the human body." A North Da-
kota farm couple argued that the corporations 
are "driving contented folks off the land to 
the already congested, crime-laden city life. 
This is certainly not the way the Good Lord 
intended it to be." M. W. Thatcher agreed: "I 
think and I believe that the most important 
thing that we have to do to maintain democ-
racy is to preserve on the farm lands that inde-
pendent husband and wife and those children 
in that castle on their land, that farm family 
on their land, supporting these villages and 
these towns and maintaining that character of 
life, or you won't have a democracy fifty years 
from now . It's both, or neither. You don't think 
there's any democracy in Harlem, do you?" 
The president of the NFU added other "fester-
ing ghettoes-Watts, Detroit, Chicago, and 
Washington. "39 
In 1968 Senator Nelson's Small Business 
Subcommittee on Monopoly held regional 
hearings on the subject of corporate farming 
(one of the stated goals was to update the Arvin 
and Dinuba study conducted in 1946).40 The 
first hearing began on 20 May in Omaha, N e-
braska. The president of the National Farmers 
Union, Tony Dechant, and the presidents of 
the Nebraska, Iowa, and South Dakota Farm-
ers Union all testified. Dechant warned of 
corporate farms taking advantage of tax write-
offs, wreaking environmental damage, threat-
ening small rural communities, and interfering 
with traditional marketing systems. Ben 
Radcliffe, president of the South Dakota Farm-
ers Union, argued that a study by his organiza-
tion discovered "452 corporations owning 
agricultural land in South Dakota, totaling 
1,633,529 acres, or the equivalent offive me-
dium-sized South Dakota counties ... one out 
of every 27 acres of farmland in our state."41 
The second hearing in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, 
was delayed by the assassination of Senator 
Robert Kennedy-who received significant 
farmer support in his presidential primary wins 
in Nebraska and South Dakota that year-but 
produced similar testimony when it was heldY 
Later in the year the NFU released its book 
The Corporate Invasion of American Agricul-
ture, hoping it would publicize the problem 
and reverse the view that the loss of family 
farms was inevitable.43 
Those alarmed by the trends they detected 
could point to several examples. Based on its 
experience operating a 180,000-acre ranch in 
Wyoming, Gates Rubber Company bought 
several thousand acres in Colorado and also 
set up egg production operations in Colorado 
and New Mexico. The NFU argued that Gates 
was buying so much land that it was driving 
land values to a level that prohibited local 
farmers from expanding. Kansas City-based 
CBK Industries moved into production agri-
culture, and the president promised a whole 
new age of farming. The president of the Iowa 
Farmers Union also reported on the 6,000-
acre operation known as Shinrone Farms, 
which bought hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in machinery from Massey-Ferguson and 
painted them white with green shamrocks due 
to the "sentimentality about Ireland" of the 
owner, a Detroit trucking executive. The Cen-
ter for Rural Affairs reported on forty-three 
"factory-type" hog operations in Nebraska in 
1974. Environmental Applications Inc. started 
an eighty-acre operation in southwestern Min-
nesota to produce 13,000 hogs a year. Swift 
and Ralston-Purina proposed a $2.5 million-
a-year hog production operation near Kahoka, 
Missouri, which the NFO feared would even-
tually "monopolize a whole type of produc-
tion" through "elimination of independent 
producers of hogs and consequent elimina-
tion of effective and efficient competition." 
The Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Com-
pany expanded its holdings to 1.2 million 
acres and started cattle feedlots and meat-
packing. The Ceres Land Company of Ster-
ling, Colorado, acquired several thousand 
acres of land in eastern Colorado to irrigate 
pastures and feed cattle. More familiar com-
panies cited in the debate include Tenneco, 
American Cyanamid, Bunge Inc., Del Monte, 
Goodyear, Gulf & Western, Heinz, Libby-
McNeil & Libby, Minute Maid, Pillsbury, 
Standard Oil, DuPont, Dow, Chase Manhat-
tan, Getty Oil, and Textron. Tenneco, the 
thirty-fourth-largest US corporation who 
promised its stockholders "integration from 
seedling to supermarket," became a symbol of 
the much-feared "corporate farmer." Once 
Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, 
Tenneco expanded into oil production, ship-
building, chemicals, manufacturing (includ-
ing the acquisition of J.1. Case), and tens of 
thousands of acres of land for growing fruits 
and vegetables, and was seen as representa-
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tive of the "conglomerate invasion of agricul-
ture."44 
In the early years of the debate the studies 
and statistics of corporate farming were al-
ways in dispute. At the opening of Senator 
Nelson's hearings in Omaha, two agricultural 
economists from the University of Nebraska 
argued that information on the level of corpo-
rate farming was simply not available, despite 
the examples cited by the many witnesses call-
ing for legislation. The NFO, on the other 
hand, constantly pointed out that the level of 
contractual integration was obscured, that the 
USDA was using 1963 statistics as late as 1971, 
and that professors at land-grant colleges were 
afraid to conduct research properly because 
they feared losing grants offered by companies 
like Ralston-Purina and Safeway.45 In 1971 
Senator Nelson held Congressional hearings 
on agribusiness "secrecy" in an attempt to get 
better statistics on the number of corporate 
farms in operation. The chairman of the 
Agribusiness Accountability Project, Phillip 
Sorenson, called for a law requiring the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission to ask com-
panies about their farming activities and for 
an annual report to Congress on corporate 
involvement in agriculture.46 
In 1969 the agricultural census included 
corporate farming for the first time. In the 
first compilation of data from the census, re-
leased in 1972, the Census Bureau reported 
only 21,513 farms with sales over $2,500 that 
were "corporate," or about 1.2 percent. Of 
these farms, 19,716 had less than ten stock-
holders, indicating many incorporated family 
farmsY But several of the conclusions of the 
researchers were challenged by Professor Ri-
chard Rodefeld, a sociologist at Michigan State 
University, in a speech to the First National 
Land Reform Conference. Rodefeld argued 
that early statistics counted the sharecroppers 
on large southern plantations as part of a "mul-
tiple-unit operation," but later statistics 
counted the sharecroppers separately, giving 
the impression that fewer large farms had ap-
peared and that fewer family farms had disap-
peared. He also argued that the aggregate 
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statistics obscured the large-scale corporate 
involvement in states like California and Ari-
zona and that the amount of sales accounted 
for by large farms was grossly disproportionate 
to their actual numbers. Senator McGovern 
argued that the "new information" proved that 
he and other anticorporate farming advocates 
were not "crying wolf' and called on the USDA 
to stop ignoring the problem; USDA econo-
mists responded by calling the "corporate 
farmer" a "straw man."48 
The statistical clash was showcased in the 
early 1970s when Congress held hearings on 
corporate farming. The American Farm Bu-
reau Federation told Emanuel Celler, chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee, that 
there is "little solid evidence that [the entry of 
conglomerate corporations into farming] is a 
serious problem." On the basis of the best 
USDA statistics available they argued that less 
than 1 percent of farms were incorporated and 
that many of these were family owned. J. Phil 
Campbell, the undersecretary of agriculture 
representing the Nixon administration, also 
opposed legislation limiting the corporate 
ownership of farmland on this basis, while also 
fearing the damage it would do to existing 
corporate farm operations. The National 
Grange also worried about the precedent, ar-
guing that "it would be the first time in our 
knowledge that Congress had passed legisla-
tion that would limit by law persons who could 
engage in a particular industry." Professor 
Rodefeld testified that aggregate statistics were 
misleading, that corporate farms were actually 
dominant in certain parts of the country, and 
that the "inevitability" of corporate farming 
justified early legislative action. He challenged 
the USDA on what he considered their in-
compatible views-corporate farming was not 
a problem but an anticorporate farming law 
would hurt many corporations.49 
The intense fears associated with corporate 
farming would slowly subside as more and more 
studies indicated that the "invasion" argument 
was overdrawn. The Food and Agricultural 
Act of 1977 included a provision directing 
the secretary of agriculture to conduct a large-
scale investigation of the structure of agricul-
tural production. The Carter administration's 
new secretary of agriculture, Bob Bergland, a 
farmer from northern Minnesota, announced 
a "national dialogue" on the structure issue at 
the National Farmers Union annual meeting 
in 1979. He aimed to overcome the earlier 
statistical problems by "amass[ing] the most 
comprehensive and reliable base of data ever 
compiled." By 1982 USDA numbers indicated 
that corporate farms still only represented 2.6 
percent of all farms in the country, but did 
account for 23 percent of product sales. 50 
Whatever the statistics, the concern about 
outside corporate control was long-standing 
in the grain belt and, unlike other regions in 
the 1970s, a consensus existed that the trend 
toward corporate farming should be opposed. 
The Populists passed laws limiting corporate 
farming in Minnesota and Nebraska, and in 
the 1930s laws were passed in North Dakota 
and Kansas. Building on this tradition in the 
1970s, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
and Missouri limited corporate farming, and 
Iowa and Nebraska adopted formal reporting 
requirements. Iowa also limited ownership of 
land by trusts other than authorized farm trusts, 
family farm trusts, or testamentary trusts. The 
Populist antagonism toward concentrated eco-
nomic power and the agrarian proclivity for 
dispersed and decentralized ownership were 
still powerful in the grain belt and evident in 
the laws passed in the 1970s. The Iowa law 
spelled out the need for a dispersed agricul-
ture and the need to preserve small communi-
ties, the Nebraska law was designed to prevent 
the potential monopolization of agriculture, 
and the South Dakota law "recogniz[ed] the 
importance of the family farm to the economic 
and moral stability of the State."51 
Starting in 1971 the US Congress also held 
several hearings on bills-usually entitled the 
Family Farm Antitrust Act-which would 
have formally outlawed ownership of farmland 
by anyone possessing more than a few million 
dollars in nonfarm assets.52 The federal efforts 
were consistently stymied, however, by the 
thin evidence of an "invasion," the reluctance 
of the USDA and the Department of Justice, 
the criticism of the measure for midwestern 
"parochialism," and the fact that Congress, 
unlike farm-state legislatures, was not made 
up of farmers and small-town business leaders 
dependent on the farm economy. Political 
concerns about the size of the bonanza farms 
on the nineteenth century Plains eased when 
the farms "disintegrated in the hard nineties" 
and so too did worries about corporate farm-
ing ease when large-scale operations like Black 
Watch Farms and the farm operated by Gates 
Rubber Company failed, further deflating leg-
islative efforts. 53 Numerous studies indicated 
that larger farms were not more efficient than 
smaller, family farms-maximum cost-saving 
production effiCiency could be reached farm-
ing under 1,000 acres of corn and wheat. 54 It 
was also discovered that the reason some 
corporations became interested in farming in 
the 1960s and 1970s stemmed from a tax loop-
hole, which was subsequently closed. The fed-
erallegislative effort also sputtered since many 
farmers benefited from acquiring new land and, 
in the Midwest, most consolidation stemmed 
from farms being bought by other farmers, like 
Ben Hogan before the war and not by outside 
corporations. 55 Even Hogan's nemesis, the 
Nowell-Safebuy, went bankrupt. The company 
should have noticed the Gates Rubber 
Company's fiasco with wheat farming in Colo-
rado. Gates had to hire 50 percent more work-
ers than the total number of independent 
farmers who previously ran the farms for the 
same amount of production. Safebuy, soon 
after it adopted its corporate ownership strat-
egy, began losing money, laid off its workers at 
the turkey processing plant, and shut down.56 
The intensity and passion of the corporate 
farming debate reflected the fears and pain of 
thousands of farm families who left the land 
after World War II. In a period when rural 
depopulation quickened and many small towns 
withered, the coming of corporate farming 
seemed a likely culprit. For all the sound and 
fury, however, the postwar economic trans-
formation of American farming did not pro-
duce a production oligopoly of a few corporate 
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giants. Farms grew and consolidated, but 
largely within the confines of family opera-
tions. Corporate involvement in agricultural 
production, whatever the extent, remains an 
issue as rural America attempts to adapt to a 
social structure with fewer farmers and fewer 
farms. 
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